Abstract. Innovation ecosystem is a technological innovation system based on knowledge spillover and resource sharing with typical characteristics of the natural ecosystem, which establishes a symbiotic and co-evolutionary competition-corporation relationship among enterprises. Economic globalization has been changing the competition pattern. The strategic choices on collaborative innovation of the core enterprises (leaders) species and the small and medium-sized enterprises (followers) species proved that, the increase of cost in independent innovation can promote the innovation cooperation among enterprises, and the continuing increase of input on collaborative innovation will affect the stability of collaborative innovation among enterprises. Therefore, developing institutional environment of funding, resource sharing and industrial policy support are beneficial to collaborative innovation and significant in the development of innovation ecosystem.
Introduction
Under the pressure from operation circumstance, the coexistence of competition and cooperation among enterprises has made collaborative innovation an important means of developing new product, strengthening competitive advantage and realizing profitable growth and has resulted in the emergence of strategic alliance, supply chain integration and innovation ecosystem. As a new innovation model of industrial cluster, innovation ecosystem breaks the limitation of traditional industry's view of strategy of using internal resources. It increases the space and efficiency of utilization of capital, knowledge and human resource through cooperation among enterprises and regards innovation as one of the important sources of competitive advantage for enterprises [1] . Cost control, quality improvement and product upgrade become the primary purposes of industry collaborative innovation in innovation ecosystem [2] . From a perspective of industrial chain, innovation ecosystem defines the operation of enterprise a value network comprised of supplier, manufacturer, consumer and stakeholder. The core enterprise (Industry leaders) and the small and medium enterprise (Industry followers) in innovation ecosystem form a biotic community like that of natural ecosystem, and form an interdependent and co-evolutionary system structure on innovation. Adner and Kapoor thought that innovation ecosystem enhances the innovative cooperation among all enterprises in the industry and therefore improves the performance of industry and promotes the development of technology [3] . Dhanaraj and Parkhe assumed that the process of value creation of innovation ecosystem is led by the core enterprises, which plays a decisive role on partner selection, innovation scale and functions allocation of collaborative innovation [4] . Dougherty and Dunne believed that industrial innovation promotes economic development, builds the innovation ecosystem which is helpful to establish partnership among enterprises and therefore promotes the development of industrial cluster [5] . Chinese scholars Chen Jin [6] , Zhang Lifei [7] , Wu Chunlai [8] thought that innovation ecosystem is a technological innovation system in the basis of knowledge spillover and resource sharing, with the feature of operating like the nature ecosystem. However, with intensified competition among supply chains, existing research achievements still lack a full explanation for some key issues on collaborative innovation among enterprises. On one hand, they lack common research framework for the influence of collaborative innovation of different types of enterprises so that they can not visually analyze the influence of innovation of different types of enterprises on the overall innovation performance. On the other hand, they lack an analysis of the result of the long-term cooperation among enterprise species of different scale and capability. Therefore, based on Evolutionary Game Theory, this research carried out research on evolutionary game mechanism of the long-term collaborative innovation among the core enterprise (leaders) and small and medium-sized enterprise (followers) in innovation ecosystem so as to provide references for behavioral decision of innovation and policy-making of innovation ecosystem.
Research Hypothesis and Model Design Research Hypothesis
Evolutionary game theory inherits the theory elaboration of species evolution provided by biology. It emphasizes that the species evolution is the product of constant learning and adaptation, which is very similar to the innovation strategy selection of industry cluster in innovation ecosystem. In general, the core enterprise of an industry or industry cluster plays a role as innovation and market leader ahead of small and medium-sized enterprises in aspects like the scale of operation, resources strength and innovation capacity. However, with the incessant aggravation of variability of market conditions and complexity of technology innovation, a single individual enterprise have been unable to obtain all resources required in innovation input, and innovation behavior has created new demands for specialized techniques and scarce resources. Therefore, cooperative innovation, substituting for independent innovation, becomes a new pattern of innovation behavior of enterprises, with which long-term advantage complementation and resource sharing bring about the coexistence of cooperation and competition among the species. Based on the analysis above, hypotheses are proposed as follows.
Hypothesis 1: There exists two kinds of species in innovation ecosystem, the core enterprises 1, 2,...,
and small and medium-sized enterprises 1, 2,...,
Their strategy choice is (cooperation, noncooperation). Under the "cooperation" strategy, core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises carry out cooperative innovation of mutual trust while under the "noncooperation" strategy, they implement independent innovation activities.
Hypothesis 2: Core enterprises spot a market opportunity and initiate an innovation program at a total cost of α, including the expenses on product development, technological innovation, human resources and technology input. If the program pays off, gross earnings will be . Small and medium-sized enterprises make a choice between "cooperation" and "noncooperation" strategy after seizing the market opportunity, which means that they have to innovate either on their own or with core enterprises.
Hypothesis 3: Both core enterprise species and small and medium-sized enterprise species are bounded rationality and go after the greatest interest and there exists asymmetric information among the species. In the long-term innovation game among the species, faced with limitations such as knowledge, information, experience and capacity, enterprises will adjust their strategies and discover satisfactory solutions by constantly learning, imitation and trial and error.
Model Design
According to Hypothesis 1, innovation strategies of core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises can be combined in four ways.
(1) Both core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises adopt "cooperation" strategy. Positive attitude of cooperation can enhance players' trust to reduce the impact of asymmetric information and thus, players are assumed to equally distribute innovation revenue of the program in this case. At that time, both of their innovation revenues are 1 () 2   .
(2) Core enterprises adopt "cooperation" strategy while small and medium-sized enterprises adopt "noncooperation" strategy. Under the "cooperation" strategy, core enterprises obtain revenue of θ, and incur innovation input at a total cost of C. According to Hypothesis 2, small and medium-sized enterprises make use of the market opportunity to implement independent innovation and gain the rest of revenue. In such a manner, the innovation revenues of core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises are C   and     respectively. (3) Core enterprises adopt "noncooperation" strategy while small and medium-sized enterprises adopt "cooperation" strategy. Similar to (2), the innovation revenues of core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises are C   and     respectively.
(4) Both core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises adopt "noncooperation" strategy. According to Hypothesis 2, both sides implement independent innovation respectively and divide their innovation revenues equally. Without technology spillover, both sides afford the total cost of α of innovation input separately and thus, both of their innovation revenues are 1 2   .
Assume that at time t, among core enterprise species, the ratio of adopting "cooperation" strategy is () pt , where 0 ( ) 1 pt  while the ratio of adopting "noncooperation" strategy is 1 ( ) pt  ; among small and medium-sized enterprise species, the ratio of adopting "cooperation" strategy is () qt , where 0 ( ) 1 qt  while the ratio of adopting "noncooperation" strategy is 1 ( ) qt  . Based on the analysis above, payoff matrix of cooperative innovation among them is shown in Table 1 . 
Analysis on Evolutionary Game
Analysis on the Stability of Evolutionary Game According to Table 1 , at time t, for core enterprises, the expected payoff of "cooperation" strategy
The expected payoff of "noncooperation" strategy is
The average revenue of core enterprises is
12
(1 )
, and then replicator dynamics equation of core enterprises is 11
At time t, for small and medium-sized enterprises, the expected payoff of "cooperation" strategy is
The average revenue of small and medium-sized enterprises is
, and then replicator dynamics equation of small and medium-sized enterprises is 11       are added. According to Friedman's research method of differential equation system, the stability of equilibrium points of replicator dynamic can be obtained by analyzing the local stability of Jacobian matrix. On the basis of replicator dynamics Eq. 1 and replicator dynamics Eq. 2, the Jacobian matrix of the system is
Symbolic analysis on determinant and trace of Jacobian matrix of each equilibrium point is shown in Table 2 . 
From Jacobian matrix of each equilibrium point in Table 2 , it can be judged that A(0,1) and C(1,0) are unstable equilibrium points; O(0,0) and B(1,1) are evolutionarily stable strategy; 11 22 ( , ) 11 22
is the saddle point. The phase diagram of replicator dynamic is shown in Fig. 1 . In Fig. 1 , S OADC converges to O(0,0), which means that both core enterprise species and small and medium-sized enterprise species adopt "noncooperation" strategy and reach the stable state of strategy; S ABCD converges to B(1,1), which means that they adopt "cooperation" strategy and reach the stable state of strategy. Meanwhile, in terms of Figure 1 , S OADC can be denoted by Eq. 3. Owing to a long time that the evolution of system requires, long-term coexistence of "cooperation" and "noncooperation" will remain between core enterprise species and small and medium-sized enterprise species.
In Fig. 1 , by joining two unstable equilibrium points A and C, and saddle point D, we get a broken line. It can be regarded as the critical line of stable states of two strategies to which the system converges. When the initial state is in the area of S OADC , the strategies of species will all converge to "noncooperation"; in the area of S ABCD , the strategies of species will all converge to "cooperation" and realize Pareto efficiency, which can be viewed as the perfect condition of innovation cooperation. Both of the states are evolutionary stable equilibrium and in either case, the player who adopts the opposite strategy will disappear during the long-term evolution.
The Efficiency Analysis of Evolutionary Game
According to Hypothesis 3, asymmetric information makes individual behavior, which based on bounded rationality during innovative cooperation, become more complex and volatile. The evolutionary stable strategy of game will be gradually realized by player's constant study, imitation and trial and error. Therefore, driven by the best interest, revenue on innovation has a great influence on player's strategy adjustment.
The Effect of Individual Innovation Cost on the Evolution of Game Theory
Using Eq. 3 to get the first-order partial derivative of C: is a monotone decreasing function of innovation cost C. When C increases, the area of S OADC reduces. Saddle point D move to point O along the straight line OB, which increases the area of S OADC . The probability of player choosing cooperative strategy increases, gradually converges to point B and reaches the balance of evolutionary stable strategy (Fig.2) . Conversely, when innovation cost C decreases, the probability of player choosing non-cooperative strategy increases, gradually converges to point O and reaches the balance of evolutionary stable strategy. Therefore, with the increase of cost on individual independent innovation, the core enterprise species and the small and medium enterprise species are tend to develop innovative cooperation. 
The Effect of Collaborative Innovation Input on the Evolution of Game Theory
Using Eq. 3 to get the first-order partial derivative of α:
a monotone increasing function of innovation input α. When α increases, the area of S OADC increases. Saddle point D moves to point B along the straight line OB, which decreases the area of S OADC . The probability of player choosing non-cooperative strategy increases, gradually converges to point O and reaches the balance of evolutionary stable strategy (Fig.3) . Conversely, when innovation input α decreases, the probability of player choosing cooperative strategy increases, gradually converges to point B and reaches the balance of evolutionary stable strategy. Therefore, with the increase of innovation input, the core enterprise species and the small and medium-sized enterprise species are tend to hold innovative cooperation back. 
Summary
According to the evolutionary game analysis of collaborative innovation between the core enterprise species and the small and medium-sized enterprise species, we found that based on individual rationality, innovation behavior among enterprises species will coexist in a long term with cooperative strategy and uncooperative strategy. The increase of cost on independent innovation of individual can increase the willingness of collaborative innovation among enterprises; Meanwhile, with the input on collaborative innovation increasing constantly, the stability of collaborative innovation among enterprises will continue to decrease. Therefore, establishing systems and mechanisms which are beneficial to collaborative innovation is of great significance in the innovative cooperation among enterprise species in innovation ecosystem. For example, we can solve the problem on the input of resources during collaborative innovation through government subsidy, support of financial institution, transfer of technology and patent licensing; we can develop institutional environment which is beneficial to the development of innovation ecosystem through taxation, industry support and intellectual poverty protection, so as to promote collaborative innovation among enterprises.
